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We previously demonstrated the presence of delay-period
activity in midbrain dopamine neurons, and provided evi-
dence that this activity corresponds to uncertainty about
reward. An alternative interpretation of our observations
was recently put forth in which it was suggested that the
delay-period activity corresponds not to uncertainty but
to backpropagating TD prediction errors. Here we present
evidence that supports our original proposal but appears
inconsistent with the alternative interpretation involving
backpropagating errors.
Because the activity of dopamine neurons appears to code
reward prediction error, it has been suggested that
dopamine neurons may provide a teaching signal in anal-
ogy to the prediction error found in temporal difference
(TD) models of reinforcement learning. Taking the anal-
ogy a step further, it has also been proposed that particu-
lar TD models may describe the activity of dopamine
neurons [1,2]. More recently, we have reported that
dopamine neurons show a gradual increase in activity that
occurs between onset of a conditioned stimulus (CS) and
reward when the CS is associated with uncertainty about
the reward outcome [3]. Niv et al [4] have now suggested
how a conventional TD model might account for this
observation without reference to uncertainty.
Their explanation relies on the fact that, in certain TD
models, prediction errors "backpropagate" in time over
consecutive CS presentations. In our experiments, on a
particular trial a prediction error occurs immediately after
reward onset, which occurs 2 seconds after CS onset.
According to the backpropagation model favored by Niv
et al, on the next trial in which that same CS is presented,
an internally timed "prediction error" would occur at a
shorter delay, perhaps at 1.9 seconds after CS onset. On
each subsequent trial, the error would occur at a shorter
delay until finally it immediately follows the onset of the
CS. This model would require that neurons show sudden
increases or decreases in activity at long but precisely
timed delays after stimulus onset. Although the imple-
mentation of such a scheme by real neurons is questiona-
ble, it nonetheless might account for the observed delay
period activation if one makes the additional assumption
that neuronal firing rate has a particular nonlinear rela-
tionship to prediction error. For example, Niv et al argue
that the difference between 1 and 2 spikes per second has
a much greater functional impact in terms of prediction
error than the difference between 9 and 10 spikes per sec-
ond. Thus, adding activity across trials, as we did to gener-
ate histograms, would result in the appearance of
neuronal activation despite the fact that the average activ-
ity at all times (except immediately after CS onset) would
correspond to a prediction error of zero. Below we present
some of the reasons that we are skeptical of the interpreta-
tion of Niv et al.
First, the nonlinear relationship suggested by Niv et al
between the firing rate of dopamine neurons and the
functional prediction error is opposite to the experimen-
tally observed nonlinear relationship between firing rate
and dopamine concentration in mesolimbic target
regions. Chergui et al [5] found that there is more
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extracellular dopamine per impulse at higher firing rates
than at lower firing rates.
Second, inspection of the published data appears incon-
sistent with the model of Niv et al. They suggest that the
delay-period activity is an artifact of averaging over trials
to generate histograms, and that the sustained increase in
activity does not occur in single trials. Contrary to their
proposal, there does appears to be strong and sustained
activation within single trials, as shown in figure 2 of our
original report [3] and in data from another neuron
shown here in figure 1A. It is difficult to be certain
whether or not activity increases on single trials, in part
because Niv et al have not specified precisely what a sin-
gle-trial increase in delay-period activity should look like,
and in part because of the general problem within neuro-
science of how to interpret spike trains. Indeed, it would
seem that any spike could conceivably represent a back-
propagating positive error, and any inter-spike interval
could correspond to a negative error. However, if we take
a more constrained, conventional approach based on fir-
ing rates over tens of milliseconds, then firing rate appears
to increase during the delay period on single trials. Simi-
larly, gradual changes in neural activity related to reward
expectation are observed in many other types of neuron
[[6,7], for example], and are widely believed to represent
meaningful increases in activity on single trials rather than
artifacts of averaging over trials.
Third, additional analysis of the data (averaged over tri-
als) challenges the interpretation of Niv et al. If the activity
during the delay period is due to backpropagating "error"
signals that originated in previous trials, then the activity
in the last part of the delay period should reflect the
reward outcome that followed the last exposure to that
same CS. Thus there should be more activity at the end of
the delay period if the last trial was rewarded, and less if it
was unrewarded. We have analyzed trials in which the CS
predicted reward at p = 0.5, and found no dependence of
neural activity on the outcome of the preceding trial of the
same CS (Fig. 1A,B) (comparing either the last 100 or 500
ms before reward: p > 0.05 in 51 of 54 neurons, Mann-
Whitney test; p > 0.4 for the population of 54 neurons,
Wilcoxon test). Thus the delay-period activity does not
appear to depend on the outcome of the last trial, as sug-
gested by Niv et al.
Fourth, our more recently published results [8] are incon-
sistent with the model of Niv et al. Each of three condi-
tioned stimuli predicted two potential reward outcomes
of equal probability. The discrepancy in liquid volume
between the two potential reward outcomes varied
according to the CS. The greater the discrepancy, the more
pronounced was the sustained, ramp-like increase in neu-
ral activity (Fig 2A) [3]. However, the phasic response fol-
lowing reward (or omission of reward) was identical
across the three conditions, revealing an adaptation of the
prediction error response to the expected discrepancy in
reward magnitude (Fig. 2B) [8]. If one were to incorporate
these recently published results [8] into the backpropaga-
tion TD model of Niv et al, then one would find that since
the reward prediction error response at the end of each
trial in these experiments is the same, the delay-period
activity representing the backpropagating errors would
also be the same. However, the data are inconsistent with
the model, since the delay period activity increases with
the discrepancy between potential reward magnitudes
(Fig. 2A) [3]. Our results [8] show that although the pha-
sic activity of dopamine neurons corresponds well to a
general definition of reward prediction error, it is incon-
sistent with the explanation of the delay period activity
proposed by Niv et al.
Fifth, it should be noted that the backpropagating predic-
tion error in the model of Niv et al does not reflect an
inherent necessity of TD models, but is rather a conse-
quence of the specific temporal stimulus representation
chosen. The implementation of different temporal stimu-
lus representations can lead to quite different results. The
original TD model [9] and recent versions [10] have used
temporal stimulus representations in which the transfer of
the neuronal response to the CS is accomplished in a
manner that appears more biologically plausible than
backpropagation. In TD models utilizing backpropaga-
tion, neural signals during the delay period are precisely
timed but are without functional consequence, since the
sequence of positive and negative errors are self-generated
(occurring in the absence of any external events) but are
presumed to cancel each other out. This strikes us an odd
notion that is neither efficient, nor elegant, nor necessary
to the principles of TD learning.
When discrepancies between TD models and responses of
dopamine neurons have been noted in the past, such as
the absence of depression at the usual time of reward on
trials in which reward is delivered earlier than usual [11],
TD models have been modified accordingly to better
describe the neural activity [10,12,13]. Although TD mod-
els have proven very useful, one would not necessarily
expect to find the formal structure of any current TD
model implemented in the brain. Present TD models
exhibit a number of characteristics that appear to be moti-
vated by the need for simplification rather than by any
empirical or theoretical constraint. For example, the pre-
diction in TD models is typically equated with expected
reward value and ignores the uncertainty in prediction. To
illustrate this in terms familiar to people (and perhaps
also of relevance to dopamine neurons), a 10% chance of
gaining $100 is clearly not equivalent to a 100% chance
of gaining $10, yet TD models do not discriminateBehavioral and Brain Functions 2005, 1:7 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/1/1/7
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The delay-period activity of dopamine neurons does not appear to depend on the reward outcome of the last presentation  (trial) of the same conditioned stimulus (CS) Figure 1
The delay-period activity of dopamine neurons does not appear to depend on the reward outcome of the last presentation 
(trial) of the same conditioned stimulus (CS). Additional analysis was performed on the data for p = 0.5 from figure 3 of Fiorillo 
et al [3]. (and reproduced by Niv et al [4] in their figure 1A). Rasters and histograms were generated after segregating trials 
according to whether the last presentation of the same CS was or was not rewarded. Both rewarded and unrewarded trials 
are shown. According to the hypothesis of Niv et al, one might expect to see less delay-period activity if the last presentation 
of the CS was followed by no reward. However, no difference was observed (see statistics in main text). A. Activity in a single 
dopamine neuron. B. Average activity in a population of 28 neurons selected for the presence of delay-period activity.
CS onset potential reward
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When visual stimuli predict reward at p = 0.5, the delay-period activity of dopamine neurons increases with the discrepancy  between potential reward magnitudes, but the phasic response to reward delivery is independent of reward magnitude Figure 2
When visual stimuli predict reward at p = 0.5, the delay-period activity of dopamine neurons increases with the discrepancy 
between potential reward magnitudes, but the phasic response to reward delivery is independent of reward magnitude. A. The 
onset of each of three distinct visual stimuli was followed by either of two potential liquid volumes with equal probability. His-
tograms represent the average activity of 35 dopamine neurons; these neurons were not selected for the presence of any task-
related modulation. Delay-period activity increased with the discrepancy between potential liquid volumes. See figure 4 of Fio-
rillo et al [3] for a full summary of this data. B. Population histograms showing the average response of dopamine neurons to 
the delivery of reward in the same experiment as illustrated in A (n = 57). Data are from figure 4 of Tobler et al [8], and 
include data from 22 neurons tested with trace conditioning (as described in [3]) that were not included above in panel A. No 
differences were observed in the phasic activation to reward in trace versus delay conditioning. The critical observation here is 
that the delay-period activity varies (from top to bottom) in panel A, but the phasic 'prediction error' response to reward does 
not (as shown in B). This data is inconsistent with the proposal of Niv et al., according to which the delay-period activity shown 
in each panel in A should scale with the corresponding phasic prediction error response shown in B. Since the two responses 
do not scale together, it appears that the delay-period activity cannot be accounted for by the backpropagation of prediction 
errors.
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amongst these two scenarios. TD models have evolved
over the years to become more useful and realistic. We
believe this process will continue and hope that the study
of neurons might be helpful in this regard.
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